More than half of all US import relationships begin with less than $10,000 annually. The median relationship is observed to last just one year. The incidence and duration of these relationships are consistent with a search model of international trade. The preponderance of small starting relationships reveals uncertainty present in formation of trade relationships. Initial size, reliability, and search costs matter and play an important role. Larger initial purchase results in longer relationships. Higher reliability and lower search costs lead to larger initial purchases and longer relationships.
Introduction
This paper investigates formation and duration of trade relationships at the product level. It builds on the analysis of Besedeš and Prusa (2006a) who first investigated duration of US import trade by showing that the preponderance of short spells is consistent with a search model. In addition, I discuss a new trade fact -in addition to being short, most trade relationships are of low value -and show it too is consistent with a search model. My investigation is motivated by Rauch and Watson (2003) .
They model a developed country buyer who searches for an appropriate supplier from a developing country. Given the uncertainty present in international markets their model shows buyers elect to start some relationships with small orders to test the supplier, while reliable suppliers receive large orders immediately. Relationships that start with large orders are more likely to be long lasting.
The empirical analysis proceeds in several steps. I initially examine only relationships that most closely match the model, those between the United States and developing countries. I then perform several robustness exercises. Finally, I study whether US import relationships with developed countries are consistent with the model. Three conclusions emerge.
First, data are consistent with a search model. A great majority of US import relationships commence with very small annual purchases with a median value below $10,000.
1 More than ninety percent of US import relationships start under $1,000,000.
There is a considerable amount of uncertainty in formation of trade relationships.
Most buyers choose to test suppliers via small orders and upgrade them to large orders if they prove capable. The smaller the initial purchase the shorter the relationship. 1 All trade values are in 1987 US dollars.
Almost a half of the smallest relationships, those starting under $10,000, last only one year. Only three percent of the largest relationships, those starting over $1,000,000, fail after one year. Duration increases the more reliable the supplier and the smaller the search costs.
Second, implications of a search model are more widely applicable to all trade relationships. All US import relationships have similar characteristics -the majority start with small purchases and duration increases with initial purchase and reliability, while it decreases with search costs. Third, the paper highlights an unexplored fact A number of researchers have used plant and firm level data to investigate export dynamics. Roberts and Tybout (1997) and Bernard and Jensen (2004) analyze factors which determine firm/plant participation in international markets. While related to this literature, this paper differs fundamentally by studying imports rather than exports. While I cannot capture capture cross-firm heterogeneity with product level data, I will argue firm-product level data would only make the results stronger. In addition, product level data highlight the significant dynamics which are glanced over when using firm level data. Besedeš and Prusa (2006a) contain an extensive discussion of differences between the use of product level import and firm level export data. The buyer's goal is to find a developing country supplier successful in fulfilling a large order. Suppliers differ in per-period production costs, which is revealed when a match is made. The buyer pays a search cost whenever a search is undertaken.
The supplier's success in fulfilling a large order is unknown. In order to supply a large order, the supplier must be trained by the buyer. The training investment immediately reveals whether the supplier will be successful.
Once matched the buyer has three options: place a large order, place a small order, or reject the supplier and search anew. With a large order the buyer pays the training investment, learns the supplier's ability, and positive profit results if the supplier is successful. While a small order results in zero profit, a series of small orders reveals whether the supplier can successfully supply a large order. If the supplier is revealed to be successful the buyer will pay the training investment and place a large order.
If at any point the supplier is rejected the buyer returns to the pool and searches again. A successful relationship with a supplier gives the buyer access to a network of potential suppliers, which costlessly introduces the buyer to a new supplier. If the buyer decides to switch, it again must decide whether to start small or large.
In equilibrium buyers place large orders with low cost suppliers. Intermediate cost suppliers are tested with small orders. High cost suppliers will be immediately rejected. Rauch and Watson demonstrate two key characteristics of the equilibrium.
First, relationships starting with large orders will be of longer duration. Second, a decrease in search costs and an increase in reliability each increase both the likelihood of a large start and duration.
Relating the Model to Data
Five key variables -supplier's production cost, search cost, and reliability, training investment, and re-match probability -are all supplier or product characteristics. I
could directly estimate the model by collecting buyer-supplier firm level import data. While difficult to deal with, none of these issues are debilitating. If small initial purchases exposed in the paper are a result of filing errors, more than half of all relationships would have to be mistakenly recorded. For short duration to be a result of overlooking long but small relationships, there would have to be a large number of those as well. Given the need to collect accurate import data for duty collection purposes, it is unlikely there are so many recording errors to significantly affect the results. For an unrecorded shipment to result in a break in a relationship, there would have to be only one small shipment in a year or every shipment during the year is below the Cutoms radar. While possible, it is unlikely that in a long relationship there will be a year when every shipment is below the Customs radar. One robustness exercise assumes that every one year gap is a result of such an error. Even with such a drastic assumption, results do not change signfiicantly.
Verifiable Implications
The Rauch and Watson model can account for both small starting and short-lived relationships, as well as why duration may vary across suppliers and how starting size and duration are related. It implies some suppliers are rejected before any transactions takes place. These rejections are unobservable as only data on realized relationships are available. 4 Five verifiable implications can be identified.
Implication 1 Some trade relationships will start small and others large. Large starts should be of longer duration.
Since small is undefined, different definitions will be used for robustness. Lower hazard rates should be observed for relationships with large initial purchases.
Implication 2
The more reliable the supplier, the larger the initial order and the longer the duration.
Since a direct measure of reliability is unavailable, supplier's per capita GDP is used as a proxy. Higher per capita GDP suppliers should have longer duration.
Implication 3
The lower the search cost, the larger the initial order and the longer the duration.
Country and product characteristics will be used to proxy for search costs.
Implication 4
The chance of a trade relationship ending will be the highest during the learning stage.
Empirically, hazard rates should be high early in a relationship's life.
Implication 5 A small fraction of successful relationships will end with a buyer switching to a new supplier.
The risk of failure should decline the longer the relationship. It need not go to zero as a buyer could switch to a different supplier. The switch is less likely the lower the cost of the current supplier.
Results
The main focus of discussion is on TS data. All HS results are remarkably similar and available on request. I first investigate whether the implications of the model hold for developing countries, defined as non-OECD members in 1988.
A First Pass
I first evaluate implications #1, #4, and #5 nonparametrically. Implications #2 and #3 can only be evaluated by estimating a hazard model. Implication #1 also states that the size of a trade relationship in the first year affects its duration. I estimate survival functions for relationships divided in five groups according to their starting size: (i) below $10,000 (53% of relationships), (ii) between $10,000 and $50,000 (24%), (iii) between $50,000 and $100,000 (7%), (iv) between $100,000 and $1,000,000 (12%), and (v) above $1,000,000 (4%). Estimated survival functions in Figure 1 are consistent with the model: the smaller the initial purchase, the lower the probability of survival and the shorter the duration.
Starting small and starting large -Implication #1

Hazard rates -Implications #4 and #5
Early stages of relationships should be characterized by higher hazard rates as buyers determine whether suppliers can successfully deliver the order. Beyond the initial learning stage there should be a small number of failures stemming from re-matching.
Both hypotheses are borne out by data. As reported in Table 2 the hazard rate is highest at its outset. More than a third of relationships fail in their first year. Beyond the first year hazard declines rapidly. About 25-35% of relationships fail in the next two years. Thereafter, there is little attrition. Between years five and ten no more than 10% of relationships fail. Once relationships last more than ten years, the hazard in each subsequent year is around or below one percent. Even when suppliers prove to be reliable and relationships are long, some buyers switch to a different supplier.
Relationships with larger initial transactions should experience lower hazard rates at every point. This implication is supported by data as seen in Figure 1 . Hazard rates never decline to zero as buyers switch from successful suppliers to a new ones.
Hazard Model Estimation
To evaluate the interplay of all factors affecting the size-duration relationship, I estimate a stratified Cox proportional hazard model
where x denotes a vector of explanatory variables and β is to be estimated. Explanatory variables capture search costs, supplier reliability, relative costs of trading, and initial purchase size. The baseline hazard, h s0 (t), characterizes how hazard changes as a function of time and is different for each strata, s. Estimation is stratified by regions and 1-digit SITC industries.
Distance, common language, contiguity, and the number of potential suppliers are used to capture search costs. Shorter distance, common language, and contiguity should make for an easier search by easing travel and communication difficulties. Two measures of supplier reliability are used. It is assumed a supplier's reliability will be closely related to its level of development as proxied by per capita GDP. 6 The other measure, multiple spells, is more indirect and requires some explanation. Some trade relationships are observed for a period of consecutive years (spell 1), followed by a period of no trade, followed by another service spell (spell 2). 7 If failure is at least partially related to country characteristics then the first failure makes the second one more likely indicating lower reliability. 8 Multiple spells are treated as independent by using a dummy variable for higher order spells. Alternative approaches toward multiple spells are considered in robustness exercises.
Suppliers from larger economies are able to commence their relationships with US buyers with larger values due to larger production capacities. Such suppliers should have longer relationships. I use GDP of the supplier country to control for this effect.
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I use percentage change in the relative real exchange rate and ad-valorem transportation costs to capture relative costs of trading. The change in the relative real exchange rate is constructed to measure how each currency relative to its competitors. Each country's exchange rate is normalized by the average real exchange rate of all currencies against the US dollar. An increase in the measure reflects a country's currency has weakened relatively more than its competitors', making its products cheaper and less likely its relationships will be discontinued. An agricultural goods dummy controls for their high susceptability to temporary shocks such as weather which may increase the variability in initial size and duration. variability in duration and greater turnover of suppliers.
I use two controls for the initial size of a trade relationship. In addition to the dollar value of imports in the first year, I use dummies representing the five groups in Figure 1 due to the skewness in the distribution of initial purchase. Initial purchase plays an important role. Relationships with starting value in the second smallest group face a 36% lower hazard relative to the smallest relationships.
Benchmark estimates
As the starting value increases the hazard decreases: by 50% for the middle group, 70% for the second largest, and 93% for the largest group. The actual value of the initial purchase does not have a statistically signifcant effect.
Columns ( Table 3 offer strong support for the model: reliability and search costs matter, and size has a tremendously large effect on duration of relationships.
A more flexible alternative
Since the size of the initial purchase has a nonlinear effect, it is possible other exogenous variables have a size specific effect. The initial purchase effect may be mismeasured or overstated by not allowing a size specific effect of every variable. The top panel of Table 4 presents results from estimating
where D i denotes the i th size dummy corresponding to the five initial size groups. The reference category are final products with initial purchase below $10,000. Reading across the columns one can compare the effect for each variable as initial size increases.
Effects of explanatory variables generally do vary by size. The positive effect of distance is the strongest for the smallest starting relationships -hazard increases by almost 2% for each 1,000 kilometers. The effect is smaller for the next two groups and it reverses in sign for the largest two groups. This may signify that the buyer does not commit to far away suppliers (expensive search) unless they will be successful.
The role of search costs and reliability increases with initial size. Except for the smallest starting relationships, the effect of common language increases with size, up to 45% lower hazard. Mexico's border with the US lowers its hazard by 17% to 82%.
Larger starting relationships benefit more from a higher number of potential suppliers with up to 3.3% lower hazard. The effect GDP per capita increases with size, but does not have an effect for the largest relationships. Multiple spells become more detrimental as starting value increases.
Larger economies face from 9% to 11% lower hazard the larger the initial transaction. The effect of the change in the relative real exchange rate increases with size from 4% to 10%, with no effect for the largest relationships. Ad-valorem transportation costs have a statistically significant effect only for the smallest and largest relationships. The largest relationships are particularly sensitive facing an 18% higher hazard for every 10% increase in transportation costs.
Even after controlling for the size specific effect of every explanatory variable relationships starting with smallest transactions still face the largest risk. Relative to the smallest relationships involving final goods, the largest relationships enjoy a 61% lower hazard. Larger relationships enjoy an inherent advantage over smaller ones.
Robustness
Several issues might bias the results: (i) measurement errors regarding the end of a spell, (ii) inability to observe the exact starting date for relationships that are active at the beginning of the sample, (iii) definition of size, and (iv) aggregation concerns.
All robustness results are presented in Table 5 .
Measurement errors and Multiple spells
There are two issues related to multiple spells. The first involves the possibility of mismeasuring the end of the preceding spell. The second involves the assumption of independence of multiple spells.
A short gap between two spells could be a result of a recording error or transactions too small to be recorded. If time between two spells is sufficiently short, then they may be more appropriately interpreted as one spell. I assume a one year gap between two spells is a result of a recording error and merge the spells creating one longer spell. Gaps longer than a year are assumed to accurately reflect failure. To illustrate suppose a country supplies a product from 1981-1983 and then again from 1985-1987.
The benchmark approach treats this as two independent spells, each three years long.
The gap-adjusted approach interprets this as one 7-year spell. The gap-adjusted estimates which are very similar to benchmark estimates.
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Two alternatives are estimated to investigate the independence assumption. Analysis is limited to the first spell of each relationship eliminating every higher order spell.
A more restrictive approach analyzing only single spell relationships is also considered. Results are reported in columns 3 and 4. While some estimated coefficients change in magnitude, results do not change qualitatively.
Starting dates
For relationships active in 1972 it is impossible to ascertain the exact starting date.
Benchmark analysis interprets all such spells censored. I estimate the model excluding all spells observed in 1972. Results very similar to benchmark are reported in column 5.
Defining size
One difficulty in empirically investigating the Rauch-Watson model is the appropriate notion of initial size. Due to product heterogeneity it may be more appropriate to use market share instead of dollar value to define size. For some products $15,000 may be big and for others $1 million could be small. I calculate market share for each supplier in their first year and divide relationships into five groups so approximately the same fraction of observations fall into each group as under dollar value cutoffs.
The chosen market share cutoffs are: 0.4%, 5%, 20%, and 50%.
Estimates presented in column 6 are qualitatively similar to benchmark estimates.
The effect of size is muted, especially for the largest two groups. The hazard rate for the largest group is 44% lower than for the smallest group. By contrast, the largest group has an 86% lower hazard in the benchmark case.
Two comments are in order. First, even when using the relative size concept larger initial transactions have lower hazard. Second, results suggest the absolute size of a transaction has a more pronounced effect on hazard. A supplier may be relatively big even though it may have only a few thousand dollars of sales. All else equal, this supplier is worse off than a relatively small supplier with a million dollars of sales.
Aggregation
In the preceding analysis trade relationships were defined using product level data.
The product level might be an overly fine parsing of data. A supplier may sell a variety of products that all fall within the same industry. Product level data would reveal the supplier has very short duration as its sales shift from one product to another.
At the industry level, however, one would observe the supplier experiences a long duration. The highly disaggregated nature of trade data might bias results toward short duration. Spells of service at the SITC 5-and 4-digit levels were computed using industry level data compiled by Feenstra (1996) Tables 1 through 4 contain results for developed country relationships equivalent to those already discussed for developing countries. All results are qualitatively similar and only major differences are discussed here. Developed countries have a higher survival and a lower hazard than developing countries, but still display the same size-duration relationship. Developed countries have relationships that start with smaller purchases. However, they dominate developing countries in the size of the largest relationships by a factor of two. Table 3 replicates the benchmark estimation for developed countries. Results are qualitatively similar to those for developing countries. Distance actually lowers hazard. Japan and several European countries have longer duration than Canada, the closest country to the US, causing the reversal of the sign. Common language, multiple spells, and transportation costs play a larger role, while the impact of GDP and GDP per capita is smaller for developed countries. Exchange rates have a much larger effect in the earlier period, but have almost no impact in the latter period. Except for the largest relationships, the size of the initial purchase reduces hazard more for developed countries. Estimates from the more flexible specification in Table 4 reveal qualitatively similar results to those for developing countries. Larger relationships have lower hazard rates. Robustness exercises (available on request) again show the relationship between the size of the initial purchase and duration is robust.
Conclusion
This pirically. Almost all empirical work uses more aggregated data and as a result does not observe much of the underlying dynamics unearthed here. Results using aggregated data will be driven by the relatively few, but very large observations. While these trade weighted studies accurately measure general patterns and relationships, there is a lot of economic activity they do not capture.
A Data Appendix
All data are available from public sources. Developed Countries' Hazard $0-$10,000 $10,000-$50,000 $50,000-$100,000 $100,000-$1,000,000 $1,000,000+ Notes: Only p-values greater than 0.01 are reported below the estimated hazard ratios Stratified by regions and 1-digit SITC industries For specifications (1)- (5) and (7)- (8) 'First year value' denotes the dollar value of imports (millions) and Groups 2-5 are defined as in Table 4 . For specification (6) 'First year value' denotes import market share (%) and Groups 2-5 are defined as follows: Group 2 First year market share between 0.4% and 5% Group 3 First year market share between 5% and 20% Group 4 First year market share between 20% and 50% Group 5
First year market share above 50%
Product level data Industry level data
